It is crucial to examine the changing panorama of vulnerabilities and criticalities in our increasingly interconnected world. Understanding the meaning of complexity and its implications allows us to see the interconnectedness of the world for enhanced risk management in technical and social systems. In this respect, a framework to assess complex systems is necessary to understand vulnerabilities and risks. We explain how this framework can provide a quick, higher-level view and preliminary risk management screening prior to proceeding into specific and costly analyses.
Introduction
Today's businesses are under increasing pressure to improve efficiency during times of rapid technological and market changes. The breakup of traditional vertically integrated industries, combined with regulatory changes in an environment of increasing technological complexity, is creating multiple interdependencies and uncertainties that did not exist in the past. The business landscape is becoming ever more complex. In addition, the effects of changes in the natural, social, and political environment contribute to unpredictability.
All infrastructures are not immune to these issues. But some are more susceptible to stresses, as demonstrated by the electric power industry, which is undergoing restructuring to competitive markets in order to improve efficiency and to benefit consumers. An issue to be considered is whether the push to efficiency is exposing the industry to higher risks, given the extent of the changes taking place. Regulatory changes, new market structures, ageing infrastructures and new ways of using the existing infrastructures are all exerting pressures on the system. The recent blackouts in North America and Europe have demonstrated the vulnerabilities of the electric power systems to widespread failure.
The question of how to recognise the risks of complex situations needs to be explored. Clearly, there is a need for a simple but accurate framework to analyse the overall risks and vulnerabilities associated with highly interdependent systems. A framework that considers key factors in operations, environment and technology has been developed with the goal of diagnosing symptoms, similar to initial medical screening of a patient by a doctor, to identify areas of concern that require further detailed investigation. This framework can be applied not only to electric power industry, but also to any organisation.
Over the years, our impressions about what constitute critical infrastructures have changed. The definitions of critical infrastructures have been altered with the convergence of technologies. As we live in a dynamic world, we must understand how all types of systems adapt during normal business operations. The old ways of building large and fixed enterprises are no longer relevant in a competitive environment. Those that will survive are those that are able to understand the dependencies within and outside the system and, of course, have the know-how to change as the global system evolves.
"I think the next century will be the century of complexity." (Complexity Digest, 2004) Stephen Hawking
The world is becoming increasingly complex. Technological innovation continues at an accelerating pace. As computing power continues to be packed into smaller, cheaper microprocessors, we have become dependent on the ubiquities technology embedded in devices we use daily. A telephone was once used simply for voice communication. Today, mobile phones are available with integrated FM radio, MP3 player, calculator, personal address book, digital camera, GPS, games, etc. In addition to microprocessor controlled engine and braking, some cars are now available with infrared night vision (GM's Cadillac DeVille) and sophisticated satellite based navigation systems (GPS) based on military technology that would have only been available on multi-million dollar fighter aircraft a decade ago. 'Black-boxes' similar to the ones used in aircraft to monitor and record data are now starting to appear on automobiles in order to improve driver safety habits and to be used for accident analysis (Ayres and Nalebuff, 2003) .
Technology has changed and will continue to change the way we live and work, for the most part improving the quality of life through better communication, improved knowledge in areas such as medical research, increasing productivity and safety, providing more choices and more entertainment options. It is clear that the 'not-always-user-friendly' devices that were designed to make our lives easier are far more complex than ever before. Despite the increased functionality and features, what is often neglected is how much more interconnected and dependent technologies have become at a cost of increased vulnerability. The recent blackouts across the world have demonstrated examples where mobile phones failed to work, including those used by police and firefighters, while traditional landlines continued to operate (Schumer, 2002) . In addition, fuel pumps did not function, and there was no water in some locations due to lack of electricity for pumping. What good are cars with intelligent navigation systems that can read detailed driving directions if you have no fuel to reach your destination or multi-function mobile phones if you cannot even place a call?
Not only are technological systems more complex, but they have also increased the ease and reduced the cost of communications and transportation, thereby permitting new, more complex organisational structures. Vertically integrated businesses that once controlled as much of the value chain as possible through direct ownership are increasingly concentrating on their core competencies. Businesses are more interrelated and dependent on external sources than in the past. In a drive to increase efficiency and maintain competitiveness, companies are entering into strategic relationships with multiple partners, outsourcing manufacturing to China and services such as call centres or data processing to India. Highly regulated and/or monopolistic industries such as transportation (airlines, rail), and energy (electric power, natural gas) have undergone or are in the process of restructuring around the world to competitive markets. While globalisation is creating a more interconnected world, technology has provided the tools to create and maintain more sophisticated network organisational structures.
"The complexity for minimum component costs has increased at a rate of roughly a factor of two per year … Certainly over the short term this rate can be expected to continue, if not to increase. Over the longer term, the rate of increase is a bit more uncertain, although there is no reason to believe it will not remain nearly constant for at least ten years." Moore's law, 19 April, 1965, Gordon E. Moore, co-founder of Intel What is commonly referred to as Moore's law has been interpreted (and misinterpreted) in many ways over the years to illustrate the trends that continue to this day of exponential growth in everything 'technological' from number of transistors on a chip, to more general comparisons of the doubling every 18 months or so of computing power as well as the increasing flow of information on the internet. As even Intel and IBM have been accused of re-interpreting Moore's original statement (Tuomi, 2002) , we feel compelled to offer another interpretation:
"The 'complexity' of all types of systems (technological and organisational) will continue to increase as the costs of technology decrease."
Up to this point, we have mentioned 'complexity' several times. What exactly is complexity though, and what are complex systems? Before discussing complexity, we need to understand the characteristic of systems. A good definition of a system is: "a set of complementary, interacting parts with properties, capabilities and behaviours emerging both from the parts and from their interactions" (Hitchins, 2000) .
The important concept about systems is that it is the interactions or relationships between the parts that provide capabilities and behaviours as a whole that are greater than the sum of the individual parts. The whole system is able to do things that the collection of individual parts cannot do if the parts do not interact. Consider that a disassembled bicycle or automobile cannot be used as a means of transportation.
Types of systems
Systems can either be 'human-made' such as machines or organisations, social systems, or 'natural' systems such as biological organisms, eco-systems, environmental systems. We can categorise systems as being either simple, complicated, or complex (see Table 1 ). A hammer and a nail is an example of a simple system. It has a small number of parts, it is easy to understand, and the outcome is predictable and has few possible outcomes. As a result, risks can be readily identified. A complicated system, such as a mechanical Swiss watch, has a larger number of interacting parts and is therefore more difficult to conceptualise exactly how it works, but the outcome is easily understood and predictable. The interactions are tightly controlled within specific mechanical tolerances so that they always produce the same result. Complex systems, on the other hand, have a large number of parts with many interactions, and it is very difficult if not impossible to understand how the system works. Not only are there so many elements and interactions among them that it is not possible to know all outcomes, but the nature of the interactions is also dynamic. The interactions themselves change as a result of dynamic external influences, and the internal structure of the system may change as well. There is a high degree of non-linearity and unpredictability associated with complex systems. We may know how they usually act or react under certain controlled conditions, but all the possibilities are not known under varying conditions. An example of a complex system is DNA.
We know something about the structure of DNA, that it is composed of two strands of polymers linked together in a double helix structure, and that it is made up of millions of sequences of four letters (base pairs) arranged in different orders that define the characteristics of all living organisms. We also know something about how DNA replicates and that there are three billion letters in the human genome. However, we do not know how it reacts to all chemicals with which it comes in contact and what factors cause it to breakdown or mutate. Dr. Lander, one of the world's leading geneticists, compares DNA to the Boeing 777, a modern passenger aircraft with three million parts provided by more than 900 suppliers (Boeing.Com, 2004) .
This comparison begs the question: is a Boeing 777 really a complex system because of its large quantity of parts? Part of the answer is that the multiplicity of components alone is not sufficient to make a system 'complex'. The number of interactions and the impossibility of predicting the outcome to all conditions are the defining characteristics of complexity. Boeing's chief aerodynamicist, Paul Rubbert, maintains that uncertainty management has become the dominant concept in applications like aircraft design (Caltech Control and Dynamical Systems Web Site, 2004) . One of the tasks of managing uncertainty is to reconcile the discrepancies of traditional approaches while recognising that all models are not expected to produce the same results. Therefore, it is essential to recognise the limitations of models used to represent reality and to understand how the sources of uncertainty affect aircraft behaviour.
An aircraft such as the 777 also needs to be considered as part of a complete 'system' rather than a vehicle in isolation. The aircraft is dependent on sophisticated communication and navigation infrastructures, such as satellites and air traffic control, and travels at close to the speed of sound in the highly variable system of the earth's atmosphere, which is characterised by unpredictable weather systems. The local dynamics of airflows are also often chaotic in their interaction with the aircraft, as anyone who has experienced turbulence on a flight can confirm. However, despite all the unknowns in the environment and the imprecision of even the best modelling techniques, the aircraft is able to perform its flight reliably because we are able to manage the uncertainties.
It is interesting to return briefly to Moore's use of the term 'complexity' as a measure of the number of transistors on a chip and see how it applies today. In our interpretation of this concept, an increasing number of elements permit an exponentially higher number of interactions between elements, to the point where all possible interactions cannot be known. Another aspect is the emergence of uncertainty, not only in the operation of a system, but in the design as well. Intel's website features an paper entitled 'Exponential challenges, exponential rewards -the future of Moore's Law' (Intel Corp., 2003) , which describes a shift in the principles of circuit design from the deterministic design of today to the probabilistic design of the future. This design shift occurs because all the interactions at the atomic level cannot be predicted for transistors ever more closely packed together. Even today there is some uncertainty in production as samples of Pentium 4 processors of identical design and manufacture reveal chip to chip speed variations following a Gaussian distribution: some with high speed (3 GHz), most average (2.8 GHz) and others lower speeds. Indeed, chips are becoming ever more 'complex' with 55 000 000 transistors on a Pentium 4 HT processor in 2002 vs. 29 000 transistors on an i8088 processor in 1981.
Self-organising systems and criticality
Complexity is also associated with the concept of self-organisation. Whereas many human-engineered systems are designed so that the interactions are tightly controlled to produce predictable, consistent outcomes (the Swiss watch), many other systems are not 'designed', but an overall order emerges spontaneously through the local interactions of elements. Self-organisation describes a concept where a system develops on its own, producing an outcome greater than the sum of its individual interactions, and acts primarily without external pressures or rules that dictate the exact behaviour between the elements.
The invisible hand
Adam Smith, the 'father' of economics, was one of the first to describe the concept of self-organising systems. His 1776 book An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations introduced the concept of 'the invisible hand' which guided individuals acting in their own self-interest to the best outcomes on a broader scale (societal and economic). Smith referred to a decentralised system of individuals acting freely to promote their own welfare through the exchange of goods and services in open markets. Though uncoordinated among themselves or even lacking knowledge of or purpose towards a larger-scale outcome, their actions often resulted in a more efficient use of resources and better economic benefits than a centrally planned system.
Self-organised criticality
Social systems such as the competitive markets described by Adam Smith are not the only ones to autonomously arrange themselves. Some 200 years after The Wealth of Nations, the Danish physicist Per Bak, one of the founders of the study of complexity, described the concept of self-organisation applied to his now famous example of the sand pile. What was new about Bak's description was that he reasoned that not only do systems organise themselves, but in doing so they tend to balance at a point where a small change can lead to large scale changes in the overall system. He called this 'self-organised criticality' and it is also known as 'chaos theory'.
One of the simplest explanations of self-organised criticality is provided by Bak's sand pile. As grains of sand are added to the pile, the pile grows. Each of the individual grains has no knowledge of the system as a whole, and acts only locally, displacing a few grains at a time. At some point, however, the addition of grains causes a large portion of the pile to suddenly move in unison and establish a new state of equilibrium (see Figure 1 ). In Bak's own words:
"The addition of grains of sand has transformed the system from a state in which the individual grains follow their own dynamics to a critical state where the dynamics are global." (Bo Kampmann, 1999) Bak's idea was so radical and controversial when published in 1987 because he reasoned that this concept of systems balancing on the edge of chaos not only applied to sand piles, but could also account for the mechanisms at work in all types of self-organising systems. Chaos theory has been used to explain the behaviours of traffic jams, volcanoes, earthquakes, evolution and mass extinction, avalanches, forest fires, economic markets, the formation of the spread of epidemics, and how the brain works. Bak believed that the world is composed of complex systems that adhere to the principles of self-organised criticality: things do not always move along smoothly at a steady pace, but are subject to occasional sudden catastrophic changes (Johnson, 2002) . Catastrophic events have a widespread effect on a system. The system either re-balances at a new equilibrium or in the worst case can break down and disappear completely. The extinction of dinosaurs was a catastrophic event causing a bio-system to disappear. The burst of the internet bubble and the resultant stock market correction was a catastrophic event with a worldwide impact that resulted in a new economic equilibrium which included an environment of higher unemployment, several quarters of lower investment, lower corporate spending and lower profits.
Failure types
When referring to catastrophic failures, we mean large-scale events that have a global effect on a system in contrast to local failures that remain isolated. A characteristic of complex systems is that a local failure can spread to become catastrophic. These systems are vulnerable to catastrophic failures. This does not necessarily mean that catastrophic failures will occur, but that under certain conditions the complex structure of the systems allows the possibility of widespread failure to occur.
Failure types can be classified as common cause failures, escalating failures, or cascading failure. Commonly cited definitions by critical infrastructure experts Peerenboom, Kelly, and • a common cause failure is a disruption of two or more infrastructures at the same time as the result of a common cause
• an escalating failure is a disruption in one infrastructure that exacerbates an independent disruption of another
• a cascading failure is a disruption in one infrastructure which causes a disruption in another.
An example of a common cause failure is a lightning strike which at the same time cuts electric power and communications to a building. An escalating failure could be a flood which makes it more difficult to reach and repair an independently owned power line in the flooded region. Finally a cascading failure is exemplified by the domino effect, or as an avalanche that starts as a small disturbance and builds up to a very large scale.
In the real world, the above failure types can occur individually or in combination. For example, a common cause or escalating failure can also lead to cascading failure. The events of September 11, 2001 demonstrate all three types of failures occurring: not only did the aircraft strikes result in catastrophic failure of the buildings (cascading), but communications, transportation and IT infrastructure were directly and instantly affected by the crashes (common cause). The second aircraft made a disastrous situation even worse (escalating). It is the cascading failures that interest us most because of their large impact. Richard G. Little points out why we need to be aware of these types of failure in his paper 'Toward More Robust Infrastructure: Observations on Improving the Resilience and Reliability of Critical Systems:" (Little, 2003) "... the catastrophic system failures that Perrow calls normal accidents cannot be dismissed as statistical anomalies -unique intersections of very rare and random events -but rather as the expected behaviour of, complex, self-ordering, and closely-coupled systems. Taken together, the work of Perrow and Bak supports a discomforting premise that although it may not be possible to predict the precise nature of the next Chernobyl or Bhopal, a cascading failure of similar consequence is to be expected if we continue to rely on the types of critical-state systems that seem to be the root cause of these disasters."
Power law
Bak explained that distributions of events that exhibited 'power law' relationships were symptoms that a system was in a state of self-organised criticality. A power law describes a mathematical distribution of events that follows an exponential relationship related to size of the event and frequency of occurrence (see Figure 2 ). For example, in the case of earthquakes, a larger number of small tremors occur regularly, but there are very few large ones. Distributions of events that follow power laws demonstrates that large events are more common than would normally be expected by Gaussian distributions. Traffic jams and avalanches also exhibit power law distributions. Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' and Per Bak's 'sand pile' model need to be considered together for their relevance to business and society. On the one hand, we have self-organised systems as demonstrated by competitive markets that exhibit higher efficiency than centrally controlled or managed systems. However, as Bak pointed out, self-organised systems are more efficient, but they are also on the verge of criticality and therefore can be more vulnerable to widespread failure. Centrally managed systems, such as the large monopolistic or highly regulated industries, on the other hand, are often characterised by being less efficient, but may exhibit higher reliability (see Figure 3) . However, most human-made systems are not entirely self-organised or completely managed, but lie on a scale between the two extremes. On one end of the spectrum, we have highly efficient but less reliable self-organised systems, on the other, highly managed, reliable but less efficient systems. The extent that systems operate near their capacity is a factor in the determination of reliability. Having spare capacity means a system is better able to absorb unexpected 'shocks'. A just-in-time supply chain with minimum inventory is more efficient than a system that maintains a great deal more inventory but is more vulnerable to not being able to deliver a product to a customer if there are any disruptions in the supply chain. On the other hand, there is an economic incentive to operate a business near its full capacity. Why invest in a plant twice the size required or run a production line only half the time?
Organisations are seldom at the extremes of the spectrum, but fall somewhere in between. What needs to be recognised is that today's competitive economic environment is pushing businesses and governments away from the side of spare capacity and reliability towards the side of efficiency and maximising economic benefit. As a result, we see restructuring of traditional government-controlled or highly regulated industries such as transportation, communications, or energy to competitive markets.
This trend towards efficiency may not pose a problem as long as the risks are identifiable. However, how do we identify risks in complex systems which are characterised by unpredictability and vulnerability to widespread failure? We need to have a framework to help us understand these systems. But first we need to understand the forces that push systems to criticality.
Criticality forces
If self-organising systems involuntarily seek the 'best' or most 'efficient' outcome as described by Smith, but at the same time tend to balance on the edge of criticality as claimed by Bak, we can then argue that the force pushing the systems to criticality is the drive to maximise benefits. If an action provides a beneficial result, then the individuals performing the action are motivated to do more of the same. This works until the benefits are no longer realised, or the costs of providing the extra capacity outweigh the rewards. These factors are at play in economies of scale or when systems operate near the limits of capacity. This is an example of a typical positive feedback loop. The system balances at the edge if there is an associated negative feedback or damping loop telling the system to stop or slow down when it reaches a certain point. In the absence of the negative feedback loop, the system continues to expand until the benefits are no longer sustainable and the bubble bursts.
The case of the 'internet bubble' is an illustration of the principle. The negative feedback provided by precautionary judgement was missing as individuals and corporations deceived themselves into thinking that in the 'new economy' the traditional measures of financial stability were no longer relevant. As a result, speculation continued until return on investment could not possibly be realised.
We recognise the accelerator pushing the system towards a critical state is the drive to maximise benefits (positive feedback). The brake, holding the system back, is relevant feedback or communication (negative feedback, telling you 'don't go too close to the edge, or you may fall over'). Like a man walking on the edge of a cliff in a snowstorm, he is more vulnerable to fall if he cannot see the edge of the cliff and does not have relevant feedback on how hard the wind is blowing or how slippery the surface is below his feet.
Furthermore, dynamics play a key role in exposing vulnerabilities. The man on the cliff may have started off on a mild sunny day, but like George Mallory who attempted to climb Everest in a light jacket in 1924 and was found frozen 75 years after disappearing in a snowstorm, the change of conditions contributes strongly to criticality. A system that is resilient to one set of conditions may fail when subjected to an entirely different set of conditions.
Changing conditions can be seen as external disturbances to the system. The changes that affect systems occur at different time scales. Very short duration impulses, medium duration oscillations, or slow, steady changes affect systems in different ways. In order to be resilient to failures, a system needs to be able to withstand disturbances of different durations and magnitudes. Besides, it needs to have responsive enough feedback or communication to be able to prevent oscillations from building out of control. Slow steady change can also have a critical effect on systems if the feedback is perceptive enough to detect small changes.
The number and variability of disturbances increases the vulnerability of systems, as do changes to the internal structure. A system that was stable under one set of conditions can be pushed into instability if either the external conditions change or the internal structure or relationships change. We have seen that a high number of internal elements combined with a high number of internal relationships between the elements are a measure of the complexity. When this type of system is subjected to high variability, there is an increased probability that some set of conditions will 'excite' the system into a type of resonance that can lead to cascading failure. This condition of excitation that builds up within a system is analogous to resonance in a mechanical system. Nikola Tesla (1856 Tesla ( -1943 conducted experiments in both electrical and mechanical resonance. Inventor of the AC motor, his research and development of the alternating current electricity generation and transmission systems was adopted as the standard used worldwide to this day. In one such experiment on resonance, he attached a small oscillator to a steel column in his New York lab. As he adjusted the frequency of the oscillator to observe objects vibrating in the room, unknown to him, the vibrations were being transmitted for miles around Manhattan, shaking buildings, breaking windows and causing panic. He had unintentionally created what became known as 'Tesla's earthquake machine' (Intuitor.Com, 2002 ).
Tesla's earthquake experiment demonstrated the hidden interconnection and criticality of systems. As in complex systems, the lack of sufficient damping or negative feedback is a pre-condition to resonance or criticality. Other key pre-conditions for complexity and criticality are the number of elements, the number of interconnections or interdependencies. We have seen that the factors which expose vulnerabilities and allow failures to occur are the dynamics of change and the lack of feedback or communication.
Analysis framework
The challenge in the largely unexplored field of complexity is how to apply this knowledge of criticality to a practical end. One problem of many frameworks that try to analyse systems is that they often focus on the details in specific areas without looking at the whole. Consider some risk analyses that look only at technology or only at management or finance without looking at the multitude of interactions.
Systems engineering seeks to look at systems as a whole, including all the interdependencies. We recognise this as an important approach that has been successfully used not only to design elaborate engineering systems such as aircraft and critical infrastructures, but can also be used to analyse business, economic, political and ecological systems. The systems engineering approach requires a large amount of time and expert skills to develop useful models. However, a slightly different approach that provides a quick top-level analysis to identify vulnerabilities in complex situations is needed. This would be of particular interest in today's business environment with rapidly changing conditions where quick, easy to use analyses are desirable.
The need for a simple framework to look at complex situations from a different reference point is best illustrated with an example. In the Ptolemaic system used by ancient astronomers, the earth was seen as the centre of the universe and predicting planetary motion often involved looking up carefully collected data in tables or performing complicated calculations which more often than not resulted in inaccurate predictions. Copernicus, using a different reference frame, introduced the idea that the sun was at the centre of the solar system. But it was not until much later that Newton really simplified what appeared to the ancients as very complex movement by expressing with one equation both the law of gravity described by Galileo and the laws of planetary motion described by Kepler (Museum Victoria, 2003) .
Per Bak recognised and promoted the superiority of understanding complexity through the use of simple models (Smolin, 2003) . We base a proposed analysis framework on an approach that combines the 'simplicity' of Bak's theory of criticality with a systems approach that looks at the inter-relationships of all the internal elements and external forces acting on system.
Framework
We propose an additional tool for risk management. Traditional tools that assess risks based on methods applicable to simple systems are inappropriate for elaborate interdependent systems. As we have pointed out, simple systems can be described by a cause and effect relationship. Probabilities can be applied to known quantities to predict the outcome. The simplest example of rolling a die tells us that there is a one in six chance that it will land on any particular number. This will always be true as long as the die is not lopsided or imbalanced. However, with complex systems, we no longer have the benefit of knowing all the possible outcomes or even the probabilities attached to each. The non-linearity of intertwined systems makes it impossible to determine causal relationships.
In the past, many statistical analyses of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, hurricanes, floods relied on assumptions that these events followed 'normal' or 'Gaussian' distributions. Recent investigations, as those by Bak, reveal a 'power law' frequency distribution of these events. Applying Gaussian statistical analysis to such events would severely underestimate the probability of large-scale events.
An assessment tool that evaluates complexity would complement existing risk assessment methodologies including statistical analyses by pointing out when traditional Gaussian models are appropriate and when they are not. A key requirement of Gaussian distributions is that there is a large number of observations on which to base probabilities and that the observations are independent, like rolls of dice. A characteristic of complex systems is that observations or results may not always be independent but may be linked through a series of seemingly hidden interrelationships.
Knowing when results of systems are linked or independent helps to determine which type of statistical analysis should be applied. One of the goals of the framework is therefore to help assess complexity in systems by exposing interrelationships among elements.
An initial view of the framework presents a type of checklist like the ones pilots use before takeoff. Similarly, an analysis of complex situations should have a guideline that prevents seemingly minor but nonetheless important issues that may lead to criticality from being ignored in any global risk analysis. Just as pilots would not risk takeoff without having completed the checklist, risk managers should have a global checklist that identifies all areas of concern before proceeding to detailed analyses.
The framework is not a mere checklist, although this in itself is a foundation for ensuring that a global view is obtained rather than concentrating only on one particular area as some assessment methods propose. For example, we know financial tools look at one aspect of performance while other analyses concentrate only on technological risks or market risks. The complexity of modern systems is such that the interrelation of elements in different fields cannot be ignored.
The framework is based on three interrelated categories: operations, environment, and resources (see Table 2 ). In each of these topics, several elements have been identified that may be linked together in certain ways with the capability of influencing other elements and, as a consequence, the entire system (operations + environment + resources). It is essential to understand what are the links and the strengths of the influences between these elements in order to understand the vulnerabilities. Examination of the list of elements also shows certain items repeated under the different headings. This is intentional as there are certain factors that play a crucial role in different areas. Communications is just one example of the vital linked elements. We know that in any corporation a key aspect in 'operations' is the flow of communication, during normal business activities, in emergency periods, with clients, employees, shareholders, etc. Within the organisation, this means the establishment of policies required in order to communicate, both internally and externally. Also, within the 'environment', there must exist standards of communication to be able to understand and to be understood by others. Together with these standards, policies, regulations, and rules, there must be communication between all the players involved. Finally, 'resources' such as tools, technology, knowledge, people, are essential to permit and maintain communication. The tools not only permit the physical connection between the players, but also help translate 'digital' information into readable information for humans.
It should be stressed that the list is not exclusive. Topics can and should be added for future review. In this dynamic world, continual re-evaluation is required, and the list presented should be considered as a preliminary version that should be further developed over time and as conditions change.
The premise of the new risk assessment framework is that complexity is related to the number of elements, nodes or parts in a system and to the number of links, or inter-relationships between these elements. A higher number of parts, coupled with a higher number of links between them results in a higher 'complexity' score. Higher complexity in itself can be a measure of vulnerability and is related to risk as we consider the long power tails in complex systems vs. the absence of these in simpler systems that exhibit Gaussian distributions.
After identifying the presence of linked elements, we can then take the analysis to the next step and identify links that have a negative or detrimental influence vs. those that have a positive impact on the system 3 . Such an analysis may give an overall positive or negative outlook on the system as a whole. It can also identify a particular area within a system that has a large concentration of detrimental influences, and as a result requires further detailed analysis. A system that has a large number of 'negative' dependencies in the financial area would no doubt require detailed analysis using the latest financial tools.
Another aspect to consider in evaluating the 'complexity' score is the dynamics of the system or changes. The external influences, disturbances or shocks as well as internal changes all need to be evaluated. With a larger number, variety, and size of external influences and internal changes, the risk is higher that some change may lead to unexpected and potentially catastrophic results.
Figure 4 Analysis framework
The main idea of the framework is to be able to simplify complexity by providing a means to detect, in a straightforward way, symptoms of vulnerabilities and criticalities in any type of infrastructure or organisational system. It is a top-level screening like going to see a doctor to detect symptoms of an illness. After this first screening to detect symptoms, it is imperative to follow up with a visit to a specialist to more precisely diagnose the problem and prescribe a solution.
The framework does not seek to provide answers to problems but just to identify areas that require more detailed analysis. The framework provides evidence of areas that businesses should look at more carefully. It is analogous to the doctor advising a patient to visit to a specialist in the given areas. This framework can be used by anyone who understands the business or industry to be assessed. It is not complicated and it does not require a considerable amount of time, a factor that is critical in rapidly changing environments.
By understanding the dynamics of the elements and the interrelations between them, we have the opportunity to see the critical issues that should be considered for further analysis. It can be seen that the higher number of interlinked elements, the more complex the situation, and the more difficult to assess using a traditional approach. The framework thus seeks to identify weaknesses in individual categories and then establish the relationships they have towards other elements. A high concentration of negative influences, or negative 'links' acting on a particular area can point to vulnerabilities in this area and will signal that further investigation is required.
"The essence of risk management lies in maximising the areas where we have some control over the outcome while minimizing the areas where we have absolutely no control over the outcome and the linkage between effect and cause is hidden from us." Peter L. Bernstein, 'Against the Gods, The Remarkable Story of Risk' (Bernstein, 1998) .
In complex systems, a framework such as the one proposed can help distinguish which areas we have under control and which others are influenced by a variety of factors not under our control. Thus, an analysis that reveals many non-linear interactions, links or dependencies concentrated in one area that we cannot directly control suggests a higher risk than a system that has few dependencies or factors out of our control. This should help assess whether such systems are riskier or less risky than we previously considered. In a business, understanding the areas that are outside the control of the organisation can lead to risk mitigation strategies that help offset the lack of control. For the insurance industry, understanding these high risk areas can lead to a re-evaluation of policies and premiums, exclusion of specific items under the high-risk categories, or a decision not to insure specific risks. For other industries, it can help identify which risks to accept, mitigate, avoid, or share, for example by purchasing insurance or outsourcing certain activities.
Many organisational and technological systems that in the past seemed straightforward and simple have evolved with technological advances and market restructuring. They have now entered the realm of complexity.
Electric power complexity
Electric power is an example of a highly complex yet critical system in the functioning of today's society. The electric power infrastructure is a complex grid structure composed of many interconnected elements with many nodes. There is an ingredient of self-organisation as the flow of electricity over the grid from one point to another is not precisely controlled. Electricity flows like water seeking the path of least resistance. It can take multiple paths at the same time and even loop back. Furthermore, the grid exhibits characteristics of resonance. A power plant outage in Spain resulted in large power oscillations hundreds of miles away in Germany, Hungary and Poland even though these locations are not dependent or directly linked to Spanish power. Statistics have revealed that blackouts on the congested grids of the USA and Europe follow an exponential 'power law' relationship that is symptomatic of systems operating near capacity and close to a condition of criticality. The complexity is not only limited to the infrastructure, but also extends to other factors such as environmental influences, market dynamics, communications and regulation among the different regions.
Blackouts
During a short period in the summer of 2003, more than 165 million people were affected by blackouts worldwide, demonstrating the vulnerability of these types of complex systems and the increased frequency of occurrence as expected by the power law.
The table summarises some of the major blackouts that occurred between August and September: 
Findings
In our publication for The Geneva association working papers series (Koubatis, and Schönberger, 2004) , we analyse the blackouts that took place in Europe and North America last summer. To understand in a broader sense what went wrong and what worked well, we ran our framework on individual blackout cases and then compared our results to obtain a global perspective of all the contributing issues. Our analysis thereby went beyond the common practice of focussing on only the technical details, by considering all the relevant factors. The application of our framework revealed striking similarities between the situations in the USA and Italy that led to two of the largest blackouts in history. Both situations were characterised by vulnerabilities in all three areas of organisation, environment and resources.
Both European and US electric power industries are in the midst of restructuring to competitive markets. They both demonstrate fragmented control of distribution and generation with key regulatory and coordination issues still to be addressed. Both the USA and Italy show weaknesses in the structures of their competitive markets and both lack demand side response programmes crucial to running efficient markets. The grids of both countries suffer from congestion and ageing infrastructure partially resulting from a lack of investment incentives. In the USA as well as Europe, restructuring to open markets has changed the pattern of localised grid flows over short distances of the past to more numerous, larger, long-distance exchanges. Finally, environmental stresses due to weather, for example, played a role in conjunction with breakdowns in communications in both blackouts.
Internet complexity
Another critical infrastructure which is characterised with exponentially increasing complexity is the internet. We rely on this aspect of the communication sector that today's economy cannot function without. However, the rapidly changing, indeed the unstable environment, threatens the reliability of the system and exposes vulnerabilities. There are so many interfaces and connections that it can be seen as a porous system that lacks sufficient protection. New threats are identified every day that increase the risks of relying on the internet for business, government and society. Over the course of a few years, the internet has been used as a platform to launch malicious attacks against individuals, companies and governments in the form of more sophisticated and faster spreading viruses. In addition, market forces and intellectual property issues also threaten to introduce uncertainties into the environment with the potential to alter the course of technological, economic and social development. We need a way of making sense out of all the complexity.
In order to understand the trends towards increased complexity in our society and the dynamic forces influencing the behaviour of all types of systems, we must also understand fundamental shifts taking place in our economies. Programmes to study characteristics of what is called the new service economy have been set up by international organisations such as The Geneva association and ASEC 4 (Giarini and Stahel 1993; Giarini and Liedtke, 2001) . Technologies have played a major role in the shift to the new service economy. We are already dependent on a wide variety of services, and there is an increasing tendency to use a larger assortment of sophisticated services. Because of this shift, society is also becoming more complex and more interconnected. Globalisation and rapid technological development are leading the way to the restructuring of the economic system. Self-organising systems are ever more noticeable with the increase of inter-organisational structures such as joint ventures, strategic alliances, consortiums, business groups, etc. All these types of systems increase complexity by joining different elements such as corporate cultures, technologies, human resources, infrastructures, and so on. The challenge is to identify vulnerabilities and criticalities in this new world.
There are many situations where an analysis framework could be extremely valuable in the field of risk management to assess complexity and identify vulnerabilities. Further development of a set of tools based on the framework is required to quantify complexity and to translate it into measurable values of risk.
Conclusions
Today's society is increasingly interrelated and associated with a wide variety of infrastructures, services, and technological and organisational systems such as energy, information, communications, transportation, and financial systems. Almost all, if not all of these systems are considered self-organising, constantly changing and adapting in the drive to maximise benefits and efficiency. The dynamics of these systems are generated by internal and external forces. Without these systems, a normal way of life would not be possible. The organisational structures and functions of these entities are tremendously sophisticated, as is their management.
Rapidly changing technology, markets, and the structure of societies have created a more dynamic interdependent world. The study of complexity is very new, and only in the last 15 years have we begun to try to understand it as a science. The discovery of the scientific basis of complexity is as profound and important for risk management as was the development of the science of probabilities over the last 800 years.
Chaos theory reveals that self-organising systems balance on the edge of criticality. Self-organising criticality means that the possibility of large-scale catastrophic events is more common than what was considered in the past using traditional analysis. Organisations around the world have been transitioning from centralised, tightly controlled models towards self-organising behaviour. Self-organising systems are ever more noticeable with the increase of inter-organisational structures such as joint ventures, strategic alliances, consortiums, and business groups, and the technologies that support them.
In this new environment of uncertainty, risk management is playing a more critical role than ever before. The scientific and academic communities have widely recognised the importance of complexity. The concept is only just starting to be recognised in economic and financial sectors as well. The varieties of risk management tools today are not well adapted to analyse dynamic non-linear systems, which makes it difficult to assess vulnerabilities. We need new tools for decision makers, analysts, consultants, etc. that show interdependencies inside and outside organisations. Most of the risk assessment tools available today are intended for very specific sectors and require a high level of knowledge in order to use them. Many tools were not designed for the new changing environment of interconnectedness, and they are not appropriate for rapid decision making.
The first step in assessing risks in this new environment is a framework that allows us to understand and evaluate complexity. On the basis of the framework, tools can be developed that complement existing risk assessment methodologies. The framework proposed has been developed for those people who need to see the big picture in intertwined systems with all the interdependencies. Because of complexity, what might be seen as insignificant on its own might contribute to catastrophic consequences when combined with other elements. The only way to understand the real risks is to have a holistic view.
This risk assessment framework proposed considers topics in 'operations', 'environment' and 'resources' and looks at the interdependencies between them. It can be applied to any type of organisation, industry or business, large or small, in order to detect symptoms of vulnerabilities and criticalities. This complements existing risk management tools, by providing an initial screening and suggesting what further analysis is required.
What are the vulnerabilities in this new world? The abstraction of complexity blinds us from seeing the real vulnerabilities. What looks very complex can be simple when viewed from the right framework. What appears at first to be simple may be more complex in reality. We need to recognise and understand both.
Our greatest criticality is to ignore our vulnerabilities.
